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Effects of Recent Events on Financial Statements *
By Warren W. Nissley
So much has already been said and written on the effects of
recent events by the many bankers, economists, philosophers,
educators, statesmen, lawyers and technocrats who have dis
cussed it, that anything said now must include much repetition.
Perhaps the only excuse for saying anything further is the ap
parent uncertainty of our best minds as to what the events of the
last few years really mean—and indeed as to what the really
significant events were. In our ideas about the depression, we
seem to be in the same situation as Christopher Columbus after
he had returned from the discovery of America. He is said to
have told the queen of Spain that "when we were on the way
there, we didn’t know where we were going; when we got there,
we didn’t know where we were; when we left there, we didn’t know
at first if we were starting back or going further; and when we
finally realized that we were actually on our way back, we didn’t
know where we had been.”
In most of the articles and discussions relative to this depres
sion, one finds little except generalities concerning the basic
facts that caused it. There is a pretty general agreement that
inflation and the subsequent deflation have been among the most
important proximate causes of many of the ills from which we now
suffer. But these are effects of the boom and of the depression—
not the basic causes. Most discussions confine themselves to
these and other immediate causes and to the cure of them, and
they do not go into primary causes at all. At first glance, that
seems sound and practical, for our immediate concern is the
improvement of the existing situation, and the elementary causes
that produced that situation may appear academic. But unless
we diagnose the disease properly, the treatment may aggravate
it instead of curing it, and some of the proposals in congress and
elsewhere appear likely to have that result. To prescribe reme
dies without definitely knowing the basic causes seems to me to be
like a fire department responding to an alarm, seeing a great
deal of smoke and attempting to put out the smoke without find
ing the fire. That simile seems particularly appropriate here
* An address delivered to the New York Chapter of the National Institute of Credit, February 2,
1933.
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because many persons with a special group or special interest to
protect are undoubtedly creating smoke screens, not connected
with the depression itself, in order that the real issues may be
obscured and their special interests protected or promoted.
In the last analysis, it would seem that we must look into the
acts of men and women, individually and collectively, for the
initial impetus causing economic disturbances and for basic
remedies to alleviate these disturbances. (I am not speaking
now of disturbances caused by earthquakes, floods, tidal waves,
crop failure, hurricanes or other happenings obviously beyond
our control.)
In times like these, it is natural for us to blame the economic
machine that we have created; but, if we are honest with our
selves, we can trace most of our distress to misuse of the machine
by our own improper acts and not to defects in the machine itself.
Our economic system has been developed over a long period of
time and has stood the test of centuries, and while it is obvious
that it is far from perfect, it is certainly the most practical pro
cedure yet developed to control the economic acts of man and
at the same time to permit that freedom of individual action and
that reward for ability, initiative and accomplishment which
we feel are essential to our personal liberty.
We must not underestimate the economic difficulties with
which we are now faced, individually and as a nation. Our
national wealth and the distribution of its ownership have in
creased much more rapidly during the last few decades than have
our economic education and experience in properly handling the
new problems created by this development.
The so-called “new era” will very probably be described by
history merely as a cyclical speculative era or boom. The acts of
man during that boom were not materially different from his acts
during previous booms, except that more people were involved.
The essential error as always appears to have been unwise use
of purchasing power and particularly of borrowed purchasing
power. I include with borrowed purchasing power that held by
corporations in the form of funded debt or as equity money. I
also include deposits held by banks and funds borrowed from
their citizens by municipal, state and national governments.
What a man does with purchasing power that he owns is
principally his own business. But the use he makes of borrowed
purchasing power vitally affects others. He can hurt the lender
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more than himself, for while he may protect himself by some form
of limited liability or by seeking relief in bankruptcy, he may
destroy the savings which the lender has set up for his old age or
for emergencies, and he may even destroy the belief of the lender
in the value of saving. I do not need to say that purchasing
power should never be borrowed except as part of a sound pro
gram for repaying the loan out of the use of what is bought with
the proceeds, either as profit entirely or partly as profit and partly
as liquidation. In the case of borrowing by a consumer, there
should be fair assurance of purchasing power to be received in the
future in excess of that required for current needs. The expected
profit which is relied on should be based on rendering a service—
an event which can be predicted with some assurance—and not
on a speculative increase in the value of that which is bought, for
the expected increase may be replaced by a decrease in value.
The lender has a greater responsibility, because he has a more
vital interest in seeing that the borrower’s program is sound than
has the borrower himself. The latter is naturally optimistic
as to the wisdom of his course.
Some of the unwise uses made of purchasing power by people
for their personal account during the new era included:

1. Purchase of securities at prices that were too high and pur
chase of many securities that were unsound at any price
and, in too many cases, doing so with borrowed money.
2. Purchase of real estate at prices that were too high and, in
almost all cases, with a down payment that was too small.
3. Failure to put aside a sufficient portion of the purchasing
power they received currently in the form of savings for a
rainy day.
4. Failure of many of those who did save to realize that savings
should not be subjected to speculative risks. This was
due in part to the new doctrine that persons with small
resources could properly buy common stocks—a doubtful
doctrine at best.
5. Going into debt potentially by adopting a standard of living
not warranted by their current economic status or by
their prospective income over a period of years. This
was caused partly, at least, by widespread instalment
sales and high-pressure salesmanship in general. But the
most important factor was the failure to realize that their
largely increased income resulted from a temporary in
flation of everything and that it could not be expected to
continue indefinitely at that level.
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Some of the principal errors of corporations and business enter
prises generally in using the purchasing power available to them
appear to have been:
1. Expanding productive capacity beyond reasonable average
needs. This also was largely due to the general belief
that the temporary speculative cycle was a “new era”
and a permanent one. The problem caused by the con
struction of additional productive equipment has been
accentuated by technological improvements which have
largely increased the production of both the old and the
new equipment.
2. Acquiring other companies and properties at prices that were
too high and creating large and complicated corporations
which, in many cases, failed to show the reduced operating
expenses that the merger was supposed to provide and,
on the other hand, produced much larger overhead ex
penses than the combined overhead of the constituent
companies accompanied by more distant management.
3. Instituting stock-purchase plans for employees who did
not have an economic status to warrant any investments
subject to such variations in earnings and prices as equity
stocks and selling these stocks to the employees at prices
that were too high.
4. In the case of financial institutions, making loans which
did not meet the test of having a sound program for
repayment. This applies both to collateral loans for
purely speculative purposes and to foreign loans which
could not be repaid because of tremendous excesses of
exports over imports.

All these are related to lack of wisdom in man, and the result
ing difficulties should be ascribed to errors of judgment rather than
to basic defects in our economic system—unless we assume that it
is impossible to educate the citizens of a free country so that they
are capable of intelligent action if allowed to reach their own con
clusions and that no system is permissible which permits them
to do so. I do not think we are ready even to consider a system
which will permanently take this freedom of action from them.
I have complete confidence that the solution of our economic
problems should and will come from a gradual improvement of
our existing system rather than from any violent change in our
social order. But that confidence is based on the further belief
that we shall develop the leaders we need who will show us the
way and will see to it that our citizens receive the proper form of
economic information and education to enable them to make
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sound decisions as to their personal problems and to enable them
to select at the polls, at stockholders’ meetings and elsewhere men
who will make sound decisions as to their collective problems.
Unless this is done, the citizens of our country can only constitute
a horde of unrestrained individual bulls (and bears) charging
around in the economic china shop, and no one can tell what the
result will be. A man’s success depends largely on the accuracy
of his foresight, and the success of nations depends even more
largely on the collective foresight of its citizens and leaders. We
must do everything possible to improve the quality of that fore
sight and to convince our citizens that fair play and an apprecia
tion of the rights of others pays best in the long run. A man who
attempts to obtain a temporary personal advantage by sharp
practice always finds that it doesn’t pay in the end. He is like
the runner who tries to beat the gun and rarely wins the race,
because the starter sets him back of the others and compels him
to start again. Those who refuse to play ball in the business
world are soon discovered and are set back by the united action
of their fellow citizens. But we are confronted by no easy task.
When we realize that our own country consists of over 100,000,000
citizens and that we must prevail on them to act intelligently
and in the interests of all and to cease clamoring for action favor
able to one organized minority at the expense of others, it seems
almost easier to try to control the movement of the tides and the
celestial bodies. It may well be that it will be necessary for us
temporarily to institute a new form of economic leadership
having more power over individual economic action than we have
ever been accustomed to in the past. If such economic power
could be granted to a supreme economic council, having the
integrity, ability and independence of thought and action and the
freedom from interference which we expect from the justices of
the supreme court of the United States, our free institutions
would not be jeopardized. Such a group with absolute power
should be able to make real progress by the issuance of orders for
certain arbitrary economic and financial adjustments which
should be far more equitable than any such action from a partisan
and politically controlled congress. I do not believe that any
such arbitrary adjustments alone will completely solve our
problems, but they should be of material assistance. Needless to
say, the result of these adjustments would appear inequitable to
many from their individual standpoint. But there is no painless
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method of making the adjustments necessary to end this depres
sion, and such a body should at least be efficient, which a politi
cally controlled group can not be. If such a body were created,
its absolute power should be continued only until we are well
started on the way to recovery, but it might well be continued
permanently as an advisory body.
The economic status of a person is at least as important to him
nowadays as his liberty. The expense of maintaining a perma
nent fact-finding national economic council would be negligible.
If a competent non-political and independent personnel could be
enlisted, its opinions would be of the greatest value to the coun
try. If such a body were in existence, I should like to see it
prepare a daily or weekly resume of important economic facts
in simple language. And then I should like to see a provision
made by law or voluntary action which would require every
newspaper in the United States to print each of these statements
in the center of its front page. Our ordinary citizens would then
be faced regularly with sound advice and would not be so ready
to believe the contents of market letters or the advice of custom
ers’ men, and sound economic advice and education could be given
the widespread publicity which it lacks today. If that had been
done in the past, I do not believe many corporate common
stocks would have sold for from 25 to 50 times their best annual
earnings in 1929, nor do I think the stock of many sound com
panies would sell today for less than their net current assets.
The widows and orphans and those of small income and small
total savings would be more inclined to place their funds in proper
hands, and brokers’ offices might never again be crowded with
thousands of persons who have no right to speculate. Our
financial leaders would be less apt to lose their heads, and the
importance of honest work, of thrift and of the homely virtues
might again be understood by the rank and file of our citizens.
I think also that the dangers of over-expansion might be so em
phasized that dishonest promoters would find it much more diffi
cult to obtain funds, and honest promoters would find the advice
useful in reaching sound conclusions. It may be impracticable
to obtain such an economic council under our constitution and,
since it could not function unless it were as free from political
control as the supreme court, it would undoubtedly have many
clashes with the executive, legislative and judicial departments
of our government.
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Even if we could obtain the form of economic supervision and
advice just described, we should still need an honest, independent
and unselfish business and political leadership actively to conduct
our daily affairs. These men would require sufficient mental
ability, first, to analyze the problem properly and, second, to win
the confidence of the nation and to get the necessary things done
to correct it. This would not require supermen, for we are not
lacking in potential leaders with the requisite mental ability,
but it would require men stimulated by less selfish and more far
sighted motives than we have been accustomed to in the recent
past. With rare exceptions, leaders are spurred on by the desire
for personal wealth and personal power, and rewards of this kind
are well worth their cost if based on value received, but the size
of the reward should be determined by those who pay and not by
those who receive it. I suspect that the thinking of too many
of our present leaders is clouded and distorted by the fear that
they may discover that the best procedure for all might be bad
for them individually or for the interests they represent. We
need more business leaders of the old fashioned type who are
accustomed to hard work, economy, strict honesty, long experi
ence in the business they direct and slow and legitimate accumula
tion of fortunes as a result of saving part of the rewards to which
they are fully entitled for services actually rendered; and we
need more political leaders with the rugged honesty of purpose
and devotion to duty that we are accustomed to ascribe to Abra
ham Lincoln. Without endorsing other qualities of the Japanese,
I confess that I am impressed by the fact that, in times of stress,
they always seem to seek out their elder statesmen and get their
advice. We are a precocious country, and look on many of our
elders as old fashioned, but it is just possible that we have relied
lately too little on experience and too much on new theories for
our leadership.
In addition to improving the quality of our leadership, some
thing must be done also to improve its economic morality.
There appears to be no definite code now which criticizes very
severely many things which are obviously inequitable if it is
admitted that management acts in a capacity of semi-trusteeship.
It would surely create a better sentiment toward management if
management adopted the tradition of the sea and refused to save
itself at the expense of those in its care. It is reasonably certain
that business leaders will adopt an improved code of their own
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volition, but, if they do not do so, an extension of publicity as
to corporate affairs and the weight of public opinion will force it
upon them. There are many difficult problems involved in
establishing this code and the solution of them must be a gradual
evolution. The public generally owes a debt of gratitude to the
New York stock exchange for its work in promoting corporate
publicity and fair dealing in the affairs of public companies. I
believe also that it is just to say that the work of public account
ants in this matter is not fully appreciated.
I hesitate to add anything to the mass of literature filled with
definite suggestions for ending this depression. But I suppose
this paper would be incomplete without something of that kind.
It seems to me that our present general economic difficulties are
reflected principally by the unsound conditions found in the
balance-sheets and income accounts of the persons, business
organizations, municipalities, states and countries that make up
the civilized world, and that these world problems are a summa
tion and multiplication of the individual problems met in the
balance-sheets and income accounts handled by credit men and
accountants in their daily work.
Moreover, the depression can only be ended as these individual
balance-sheets and income accounts are put on a sound basis.
It would be desirable, of course, to find some single process or
procedure by which all balance-sheets and income accounts could
be corrected simultaneously and in a painless manner; and there is
a constant flow of suggestions of actions which are supposed to
be able to accomplish this. Some people think that some form
of inflation, or of the newly discovered reflation, will accomplish
the trick. Others think that cancelling war debts, lowering
interest rates, reducing armaments, controlling production,
constructing self-liquidating projects, increasing foreign trade,
hiding behind a prohibitive tariff wall, granting bonuses to farmers
or others, etc., will do it. There is no doubt that some of these
might be helpful. But the inter-relationships between these
individual balance-sheets and income accounts are so complex
that an adjustment of one set frequently creates even more diffi
cult problems in others, and it is too much to hope that a single
procedure can adjust them all and particularly that any single
adjustment can keep everyone in the position in which he
thought he was several years ago. There are bound to be many
tragedies of the most heart-rending type involving much mental
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and some physical suffering as a result of these adjustments.
But the sooner we realize that these balance-sheets and income
accounts must be adjusted one at a time, and by a process of give
and take, the better it will be for all concerned. It is going to
require a very substantial period of time to complete the job.
But there is no sense in hoping for a panacea.
In this work of adjustment, credit men and accountants will
play a prominent part. And if, in the future, the public will look
to them for advice on economic and financial subjects, I think
we may avoid some of the excesses of the next boom period—for
a boom period is certain to follow this depression. As long as our
citizens have the right to buy what they want whenever they
want to, or are able to, we are certain to have wide variations in
the volume of business done, and we know the effects of the circle
by which increased buying increases employment which again
increases buying and expansion of manufacturing, and so on.
That circle is commonly called vicious when buying is decreasing,
but it may be just as vicious when it is increasing. Also, as long
as we have the instinct to take chances which in the past has been
of great value in developing the country, we shall have specula
tion. But the variations in buying and the extent of speculation
can be kept within reasonable bounds by more widespread eco
nomic education as to sound methods of determining relative
values and by better leadership in business, banking and politics.
Now let us consider briefly the effects of the events of the
recent boom on balance-sheets and income accounts of business
organizations. Some of the principal effects were the following:
On income accounts:
1. Gross volume of business increased.
2. Instalment selling and high-pressure salesmanship in
creased.
3. Manufacturing costs decreased at the same time that
wages increased.
4. Overhead expenses increased.
5. Net profits increased.
On balance-sheets:
1. Plant and property accounts were increased by new addi
tions and by write-ups as a result of appraisals.
2. Working capital and total capital increased.
3. Fixed debt and floating debt decreased.
4. Corporations entered into the policy of selling their own
stock to their employees, principally on the instalment
plan.
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5. Complicated corporate structures increased.
6. No-par-value stock, stock split-ups and stock dividends
became common.

It is not my purpose to enter into a lengthy discussion of these
factors as they are largely of historical value. It may be worth
while, however, to discuss them briefly since many of the read
justments now necessary were caused by the events of the period
ended in 1929.
The effects that were most apparent were the large increase
in the volume of business available and the increase in manufac
turing facilities. By the development of new machinery and the
improvement in the efficiency of workmen, manufacturing costs
per unit of finished product were materially reduced, although
wages per hour were largely increased. As a result, selling prices
of finished products were increased much more slowly than wages
were increased, and, at the same time, sales were made at large
profits. Under these conditions, those who received wages and
those who received dividends found themselves in possession of
largely increased purchasing power in terms of the things it would
buy as well as in terms of dollars.
The momentum of the demand created by this increased
purchasing power caused industrial units to expand their plants
far beyond our average requirements, and, indeed, beyond the
demand existing at the height of the boom. The results finally
were an accumulation of inventories in excess of what could be
sold, and, more serious still to the price structure, the existence of
plant facilities which were able to produce additional potential
inventories on short notice.
Many corporations also increased their equity capital, by large
sales of new securities as a result of easy conditions in the money
market, and reduced or paid off their bank loans in addition to
paying for new construction from this new capital. In many
cases, corporations held so much cash as a result of earnings in
excess of dividends or of excessive capitalization that they became
important factors in the loan markets. This absence of impor
tant liabilities and strong cash position at the end of the boom
period explains the comparatively small number of important
industrial bankruptcies since the depression began.
The boom period was also characterized by the practice on the
part of many companies of having their plant and equipment
appraised and set up on their balance-sheets at the appraised
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values. This was undoubtedly done in many cases to attempt
to justify by the balance-sheet part, at least, of the ridiculous
prices at which the companies’ securities were selling in the market.
New doctrines for calculating the value of stocks on the basis
of earnings were also developed. It used to be the practice to
find the average earnings per share for a five or ten year period
and multiply that result by a factor averaging, say, 10, but de
pending on the risks of the particular business in any particular
case, to determine a fair value for the stock. This was based
on the assumption that the future might be expected to produce
about the same average earnings as the past. But, during the
“new era,'’ the annual earnings were calculated as twelve times
those of the most recent month, frequently the most profitable
month in a company’s history, and that amount was multiplied,
not by ten, but by anything from twenty to fifty, if we are to
judge from the market quotations of that period.
The theory of stock split-ups and stock dividends was also
devised during this period and very plausible explanations were
advanced to justify their use. The split-ups were said to afford
a means for the small investor to participate in the profits of
industry. The stock dividends were said to eliminate the neces
sity of paying finance charges for new capital which it would have
been necessary to raise if the earnings had been paid out as cash
dividends. However, it is quite possible that, in some cases at
least, both stock split-ups and stock dividends were used to
promote speculation in the company’s securities. An investor
who could buy a share of a stock after a split-up, but not before,
obviously had such limited resources that he should not have been
subjecting them to the risks of equity stock at all. There is,
perhaps, more justification for the stock-dividend idea if it repre
sents a real capitalization of surplus earnings and if the recipient
understands what he is getting. If, however, the total cost of
issuing, exchanging, recording, buying and selling the scrip
representing these dividends is all taken into account, it will be
found to absorb a substantial part of the saving in finance charges
for new capital issues.
Stock without par value, without which the practice of stock
split-ups and stock dividends would not have been so common,
was introduced for the protection of the investor. It was
thought that when he saw a certificate with $100 par value on it,
he would be misled into thinking it was worth that amount. It
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is doubtful whether stock without par value has been as great an
improvement as was hoped. Now the average investor has no
idea what he is getting.
While all of these things were happening, the volume of business
being done by industry and commerce began to decline, in many
cases because more was being produced than could be used, and
finally the speculative bubble burst during the latter part of 1929.
Since then we have been groping around. At first, few ad
mitted that we were in real trouble. We were presented with
the extraordinary spectacle of our national government encour
aging business leaders to set things right by expenditures for
increasing their plants when it was quite apparent that one of our
principal difficulties was the excessive industrial capacity we
already had. Since that time there has been a gradual recogni
tion of the fact that this is a major depression, and this recognition
has resulted in a series of movements instigated by the govern
ment with which all are familiar—some designed to nullify the
effects of the law of supply and demand and others to avert
panic resulting from mass psychology. The latter have been
quite effectual, but the former have not. It seems doubtful
whether anything of lasting value can be accomplished by artificial
methods to alter the natural effects of the law of supply and
demand. We must try to convince suppliers that it is common
sense to keep the supply within reasonable limits and give them
some legal machinery to enable them to do so. And we must
rely on pent-up demand and an appeal to the patriotic duty of
those with purchasing power to use it in advance of actual neces
sity, but for sound purposes. It can be shown that if the record
of many years in the past is any criterion, people will save money
by buying now. We shall then have reflation on the only
sound basis—the natural working of the law of supply and demand.
Let us now consider the present.
Most business has been progressively worse so far as profits
are concerned during 1932, and income statements must be
expected to reflect that fact. On the other hand, many com
panies find themselves in a very good cash condition. In spite
of operating losses, cash has been maintained or even built up in
some cases because of reduced inventories and receivables and
charges for depreciation in excess of the cost of replacements.
I think that the outstanding effect, other than the normal one to
which I have referred, of the happenings of 1932, on balance
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sheets and income accounts will be the burial of the remains of
that period once described as the “new era.” In most cases,
the statements will show the interment in the full light of day
because such burials are fashionable now and appear to cause
little criticism. Most executives appear to think that those
errors of judgment during the “new era,” which were the cause of
the major adjustments now necessary in the accounts of their
companies, were errors universally made by all managements.
And they realize that if these adjustments are not made now, they
will have to be made in the future. So far as the adjustments
apply entirely to the past, it appears proper to clean house now,
but it is important to ascertain whether or not any of them are
designed to relieve the future of any charges that should properly
be borne by later periods. Management is very much interested
in having future statements appear as favorable as possible,
because, while accounting is frequently described as the tool of
management, published periodical financial statements are also
the master of management—if management may be said to have
a master with the present wide distribution of the financial owner
ship of business enterprises. People know that past errors of
judgment may be excused, but that those of the future will not
be passed so readily, and the ability of management will be tested
during the years to come as never before. If the stockholders
are displeased with the results shown, they can not, unless they
are very large stockholders, do anything about changing the
management. But, to quote from a report of a committee of the
American Institute of Accountants, “the only practical way in
which an investor can today give expression to his conclusions
in regard to the management of a corporation in which he is
interested is by retaining, increasing or disposing of his invest
ment, and accounts are mainly valuable to him in so far as they
afford guidance in determining which of these courses he shall
pursue.”
The unusual adjustments to which I have referred are almost
entirely concerned with writing down the book values of such
assets as the following:
1. Inventories.
2. Accounts receivable from and investments in affiliated
enterprises.
3. Accounts and notes receivable from officers and employees,
largely representing unpaid balances on subscriptions to
the capital stock of their own corporations.
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4. Accounts with customers and banks which have become
insolvent or bankrupt.
5. Securities purchased for the temporary investment of excess
funds.
6. Investments in the companies’ own securities.
7. Property and plant.
In most cases, these write-downs will be charged to earned
surplus or to capital surplus which may have been created for
this purpose; in others to the operations of the current year.
One could argue at great length as to which is better and reach
no conclusion that would be unanimously accepted. I content
myself with saying that, since presumably all of the adjustments
are necessary primarily because of current economic conditions
rather than because of any act of the management except failure
to recognize they were coming, or of anything connected with the
ordinary business of the company, it doesn’t matter much where
the charge-off is made so long as the disclosure is complete. After
all, one looks at an income account primarily to use it as an aid in
predicting future income. The ordinary reader will assume that
the next year’s income will perhaps be the same as that of the
current year, or, at best, he will determine the trend by merely
comparing the income of the current year with that of the preced
ing year. From the viewpoint of such a reader, a better picture
of the future is obtained if both non-recurring income and non
recurring losses are eliminated from the income account. On
the other hand, in point of technical accounting, such write-offs
are expenses applicable to the income of some year, and the statis
tician will want to have them in the income account to determine
the long-time trend of the company’s earnings. The statisti
cian, however, can reinstate all surplus charges and credits in
the income accounts of the years to which they really apply
rather than in the years in which the entries are made in prepar
ing his figures—and that was the practice of accountants in
ascertaining the ten-year-average earnings in the good old
days.
The wisdom of stating inventories and receivables at their
present value, which is presumably the approximate value at
which they will be liquidated, can hardly be challenged. Whether
or not investments in outside securities should be written down to
market values depends on whether they will be liquidated at or
near those values and on whether or not the income to be received
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in the future will be on the basis of those values. Since no one
can answer that question now, it appears conservative to write
them down. If they are not so written down, their market value
should be shown on the face of the balance-sheet as part of the
descriptive matter. If these securities are subsequently sold,
there should be no credit to the income account for the amount
realized in excess of the written-down value, except perhaps for
any profit on the basis of the original cost.
If a company has purchased its own securities and is holding
them in the treasury for subsequent sale to its employees or
otherwise, it is proper to write down to market the value at which
they are carried. If such securities are definitely held for retire
ment, they need not be written down below the amount of capital
equity which they represent on the balance-sheet. It is prefer
able, however, to show stock held in the treasury for retirement
as a deduction from stock outstanding.
There is less accounting justification for drastically writing
down the book values of investments in depreciable plant and
equipment—particularly where those values originally represented
a bona-fide cash cost. Theoretically, it is entirely improper to do
so if it is expected that the reproductive values when the assets
must be replaced will be higher than the values to which they
are now written down, since funds would not be available in the
depreciation reserve to replace them at these higher prices. But,
in practice, very few companies ever have cash and marketable
securities in excess of current requirements sufficient to cover the
depreciation reserve. It is quite a general practice to use cash,
representing depreciation charges in excess of what is needed
for current replacements, as working capital to buy additional
plant and equipment or to retire funded debt or prior lien stock.
The justification given by managements for this procedure is that
they can make or save more by using the cash in this manner
than they could obtain in yield from outside investments. Since
major replacements only become necessary at infrequent inter
vals, managements feel that new capital can be obtained when
the replacements are needed.
There are practical arguments in favor of these property write
downs. One, which, of course, should have no weight with the
management, is based on the present market values of corporate
securities which, in many cases, reflect no value whatsoever for
property and plant.
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There are also, however, practical arguments in favor of the
practice from an operating standpoint.
The prime motive in reducing property values now is the desire
to reduce the annual charge for depreciation in the future. The
cost of goods manufactured, calculated on the basis of this re
duced depreciation is naturally less than it would be on the former
basis. It would not be sound to reduce depreciation just to fix
selling prices on these lower costs if it were possible to sell at
higher prices. But the excess productive capacity in industry to
which I have already referred and the intense struggle which we
must expect for the business that is available, together with the
fact that depreciation and obsolescence expense goes on whether
the equipment is used or not, means that competition will make
it necessary for the high cost companies practically to eliminate
depreciation for the time being in calculating costs for selling
prices in many industries if competitive selling prices are to be
met. And if they are not met, there will be no business available
for such companies. This simply means that to keep their
organizations together, these companies in fixing selling prices
will, for the time being, not only use their equipment without
hire but without charging for the portion of it which wears out.
That must be a temporary expedient or liquidation will result
from using up equipment without any provision for replacing it,
since naturally new capital can not be raised for new equipment
on that basis. But we must expect that this excess capacity
will eventually be taken up by the release of accumulating de
mand or that it will be corrected by the elimination of the weaker
companies through bankruptcy, and that proper accounting for
the depreciation of plant and equipment will be resumed. The
real solution will probably be a combination of the two movements.
It has been stated that a company could be honest with itself
and sell at a book loss just as well as it can pretend that there is no
loss and hide the actual loss by manipulation of the depreciation
account. That is quite true theoretically. But it is necessary to
remember that management is human. If executives give their
best service and yet are compelled to report large losses regularly
as a result of widespread deflation of all plant and equipment
values as compared with the book values of their equipment, they
become discouraged. This is particularly true if the officers are
newly appointed and feel that they are not responsible in any
way for the inflated values, and there will probably be many
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changes in management which will result in placing new officers in
control. Observation of the reactions of executives to operating
results as shown by the accounts impresses me with the impor
tance from the psychological viewpoint, of removing any mill
stones from their necks,—always assuming that these millstones
are not their own creation.
There also appears to be a practical advantage for the stock
holders. This will not become apparent until the unsound
competition and price-cutting to which I have just referred, have
been relieved, for there will be few companies that can make
profits until that time. In most cases, these write-downs will,
of necessity, be accompanied by a reduction in capital which will
be credited to surplus so that there will be sufficient surplus
available against which the write-downs can be charged. As a
result, when current earnings and cash are again available, it will
be legally possible to pay dividends which in many cases could
not have been paid without the capital reduction and property
write-down because, if these things had not been done, their
deficits would have accumulated.
It should be noted that as the stockholder gets nothing back
when the capital is reduced—i. e., the reduction is not a liquidating
dividend—future dividends may appear to be paid out of earnings
and earned surplus on the company’s books but, to the extent of
the capital reduction, they will represent a return of original capi
tal to the stockholder. We may have companies reporting losses
for federal income-tax purposes, for which the old depreciation
rates can be used unless the present laws are changed, which will
show earnings on their published reports.
I do not think, however, that any stockholder will object to
receiving dividends, provided they can be paid without injury to
the company, even if, technically, they represent a return of capi
tal. The stockholders want dividends on any plan which will
enable them to get their hands on the money. This procedure is
a matter of concern to all creditors, however, particularly long
term creditors, since the size of the capital fund which the corpora
tion must legally maintain for protection is materially reduced by
these large capital reductions, and it will be possible to withdraw
cash in the future to pay dividends which could not have been
withdrawn without a formal reduction in capital.
There is no question that frequently writing property values up
and down destroys part of the value of comparative balance
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sheets and income accounts. And we all remember that it was
not long ago when many companies were writing them up. How
ever, whether such changes in values are ideal or not, they are
being made and accountants can only report things that happen.
It is highly important, therefore, for credit men to insist on know
ing the charge for depreciation each year, if it is not shown sepa
rately in the accounts available, before one can make an intelligent
comparison of the operating results of one year with those of an
other. The New York stock exchange now considers it good
form for listed companies to give public notice of all changes in
their depreciation policies. And when one compares the invest
ments in plant and equipment from year to year, one should
know what portion of the difference represents actual additions
and deductions from equipment and what portion of the differ
ence reflects a different scheme of valuation.
Since depreciation does not constitute a current expenditure of
cash, the amount of it and the method of handling it in the ac
counts are not so vital in effecting recovery from the depression as
are items of cash income and cash expense. I said that I thought
all income accounts must be adjusted to reflect current conditions
before the depression can be ended. That means that everyone
should do the thing that he can do himself,—both as to his own
personal income account and as to those which he controls in a
managerial capacity—i. e., he should reduce the cash expenses so
that they shall be at most no greater than the cash income. That
will probably involve some additional unemployment, although
this can be avoided if the policy of spreading the work and work
ing shorter hours is adopted, as I think it should be. For society
as a whole, it is far better for all to have some work and some in
come than for a considerable group to be dependent on public
charity of one form or another.
While persons can control their expenses, they are dependent on
the actions of others for control of their income. The recovery of
income can be accelerated somewhat by clever, but sound, sales
manship and by creating products to satisfy new needs. But the
really substantial recovery must come from the gradual accumula
tion of deferred buying which eventually will be released. The
potential demand for parts and labor which will be needed to cover
the deferred maintenance of our railroads, public utilities and
industrial plants is enormous. Sooner or later, and certainly
within the next few years, the demand for automobiles will be a
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very important factor in starting economic recovery. The pro
posal of the steel industry to supply steel in standard sizes and
shapes for the construction of domestic housing appears to offer
much potential business to that industry. And, in general, we
can feel certain that the accumulation of deferred buying for the
personal needs of our millions of citizens will gradually reach the
point where there will be a net increase in buying. As soon as a
substantial part of our population believes that point to have
been reached, mass psychology will cause those with buying
power to come in with a rush and those who waited that long will
find that they have missed the bottom of the market. I do not
say that point is here yet—and in the meantime those who are
worthy and are without employment should receive all possible
help from their more fortunate neighbors—but I do believe the
natural turning point will be reached before any help can be ob
tained from any of the so-called panaceas, and, moreover, I think
the time required to reach that turning point is lengthened by the
search for panaceas.
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